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INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE 
COUNTRIES AND THE FOREIGN POLICY (THEORIES 
AND PRECEDENTS) 
Aneta Stojanovska-Stefanova & Drasko Atanasoski & Zoran 
Chachorovski 
In order to recapture the essence and justification of this paper, the 
source of this theoretical review was found in the definition of statehood. 
After the end of the thirty years of civil war in Europe and the signing of the 
peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the creation and development of the 
country began to the form that we know today. In terms of increasing 
interdependence between the countries, the question of their mutual 
cooperation is essential. For the states equally important segment with 
internally arranged relations is the manner on which they concern and 
regulate the international relations. State boundaries are endpoints to 
where sovereignty lies within a country. The authorities within it regulate 
the relations inside and the nature of its international positions. The highest 
authority, which does not recognize any other form of higher power, is 
sovereignty. Considering that the law, especially the international, is an 
active matter open to interpretation, although the basic features of a 
country are clear, yet there are two types of states divided to a de jure-
existing under law and de facto-existing in reality, based on the matter 
whether and which of the characteristics of statehood they own.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The institute of international recognition is one of the instruments for 
development of cooperation with other countries on the basis of their 
common interests. This institute of “recognition of countries” is known in 
League of Nations and United Nations. The legal effects from the 
recognition of countries are limited if they are downsized only to a 
declarative act but they can also be constitutive and more serious, if 
followed by an establishing of other legal and economic pressures such as 
isolation and boycott. 
It is important to be emphasized that the recognition of countries is not 
directly related with the establishment of diplomatic relations. Namely, it 
can happen that the country can be recognized without any diplomatic 
relations to be established, however the oposite is not possible because 
establishing of diplomatic relations also means recognition of that country. 
The foreign policy of a country depends from many factors but, above 
all, from the interests of the country in terms of specific issues.  
Regardless of the existence of dilemmas regarding the sense on one 
hand and the challenges it faces before the light of globalization on other, 
the country manages to realize the obligation towards its citizens, who 
indirectly manage it, in the past centuries. As a result of the above, we can 
provide a conclusion according to which the modern democratic state must 
exist on the principle of “sacredness of the person”. It entrusted their basic 
rights to satisfy the need and to create the preconditions for realization of 
aspirations without bringing into question the satisfaction of the needs and 
realization of the aspiration of other citizens who are part of the same 
community, i.e. country. These conditions, to a large extent, are provided by 
the democratic state which although is not perfect according the words of 
Churchill saying that the human mind did not managed to implement in the 
practice better form of state organization. 
The state as a subject of the international law in its broadest sense of 
the word is defined through its four basic characteristics: 
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 Population; 
 Territory; 
 Power; 
 Sovereignty. 
The sum of all citizens who live within a defined territory, divided by 
other territories, and who are under an authority and have established 
relations with the state through legal relations of statehood is called 
population. 
The territory is an area separated by other territories by borders where a 
specific population lives and which has established authorities.  
The state borders are end points to where the sovereignty of one 
country expands. 
The authority within one country regulates the relations within that 
country as well as the character of its international positions. 
The highest authority that does not recognize any other higher form of 
authority is the sovereignty.1 
The landmarks of a modern state as we know today are defined by the 
Westphalian Peace Treaty2 according to which the state is constituted by 
three main characteristics: territory, population and sovereignty, i.e. absolute 
power of rule3. In order to understand the process of recognition better and 
the different specification which appeared throughout the history, we will 
first pay attention to the terms sovereignty and statehood, what sovereignty 
means and how one state acquires it, and later the manners through which 
the countries recognize the existence of another country. The state is seen as 
a primary factor and the citizens expect solution of their problems and social 
needs. Although this partially is due to the unsolved existential problems of 
social nature, we cannot help but notice the strong tendency of individuality 
and social alienation. Also a political culture, which is closely related with 
the creation of cult of the person, is created among the citizens towards the 
personality of specific political figures as a result of the remaining of the 
leftovers of the past. The citizens still largely prefer leaders who will rule 
with a strong hand than development of democratic society4.  
                                                 
1 WILLIAMS, GOLDSTEIN & SCHFRITZ, CLASSIC READINGS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 82 (Belmond, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company). 
2 PEACE OF WESTPHALIA, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, www.britannica.com (last visited June 1, 2016). 
3 THE CRISIS OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE “PRIVATIZATION” OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, www.heritage.org (last visited June 1, 2016). 
4 Strasko Stojanovski, Jadranka Denkova & Jovan Ananiev, Перцепциите на граѓаните за 
транспарентноста и партиципативноста во процесот на донесување на одлуки во единиците 
на ликалната самоуправа во Источниот плански регион на Република Македонија, 5 ANNUAL 
YEARBOOK OF THE FACULTY OF LAW (ISSN 1857-7229) 287—305 (2016). 
274                US-CHINA LAW REVIEW            Vol. 14: 271 
 
I. NOMINAL DEFINITION OF SOVEREIGNTY  
The sovereignty means supreme and independent power within a 
defined territory and its population. This kind of interpretation which is part 
of a broader definition of a state plays enormous role in every aspect of 
international relation and international law because it highlights that no one 
else, meaning another country above all has not got the right to prescribe or 
implement law on a territory of the sovereign country. Having in mind the 
above, the use of force for implementation of the law lies in the hands of the 
entity that holds the power regardless if that entity is the government, 
president or divided sovereignty between two institutions. Hence, once a 
country acquired sovereignty and it is recognized by other countries, those 
countries recognize its power over the defined territory and population and 
denounce the possibility to interfere in the internal affairs of the country 
they recognized.  
The sovereignty can generally be divided into: 
 National; 
 Foreign. 
The national sovereignty is established by a state body with authority 
to practice power, while the foreign sovereignty portraits the country as a 
sole unit in the international community which refers the country as a holder 
of rights and obligation in terms of other country on international level. 
Having in mind the meaning of the term sovereignty, the meaning and 
role of the decision whether a country will be internationally recognized or 
not as well as the need every territory and nation that prefer to become a 
country to provide conditions for acquiring of the sovereignty. 
II. ACQUIRING SOVEREIGNTY 
Sovereignty is generally acquired on five manners, four of which are 
recognized by the international law5.  
The first manner is through population of “no one’s land”, i.e. land 
with no claimed sovereignty or if that land was under someone’s authority 
and the previous ruler denounces that the rights to lands thus removing the 
obstacles a new or different country to implement is sovereignty on that 
territory.  
 
                                                 
5 Aneta Stojanovska, Process and Methods of Recognition of States in ANNUAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
FACULTY OF LAW, GOCE DELCHEV UNIVERSITY—SHTIP (ISSN 1857-7229) 267 (2nd August Printing 
House—Shtip 2009). 
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The second manner is related with the first one and envisages acquiring 
sovereignty through its practicing during longer period of time on the 
territory and that right not to be challenged by any other country. 
The seceding is the third manner for acquiring sovereignty. However, 
that must be implemented with approval of the country which the newly 
seceded territory previously belonged to. In this case we have a transfer of 
rights from one country to another, most often by agreement. The modern 
trends and the emergence of the idea for self-determination oblige the new 
country to obtain consent by the population that live on the territory which 
seeks sovereignty before it may occur. This is the case of the union between 
East and West Germany where the four occupying countries, USA, France, 
Great Britain and Soviet Union gave consent for implementation of that 
process and gave up the right to sovereignty on their part of the German 
territory. The people also voted positively.  
The fourth of the five methods is not considered legal method of 
acquiring sovereignty today due to the fact it is based on conquering which 
is considered illegal by the United Nations and it is prescribed as such in 
their charter which is signed and ratified by every member-country. 
The fifth and last type of acquiring sovereignty over a specific territory 
is if it is formed as an additional part of already existing territory by a way 
of natural growth such as sedimentation and volcanic activity. 
III. DE JURE AND DE FACTO COUNTRIES 
Having in mind that the law, especially international law, is a live 
matter opened for interpretation although the basic features of one country 
are clear, two types of countries can be established. They are divided to de 
jure countries that exist according the law and de facto countries that exist 
in reality on the basis of whether and what characteristics of statehood they 
have6.  
De jure countries are those which fulfil some of the conditions for 
statehood but not all three. For example a country that has a territory and 
population but not complete sovereignty over them. Also another example is 
a government in exile, i.e. government which according the international 
community has a right to sovereignty over a defined territory and population 
but due to occupation it cannot enjoy that right, such as the case with the 
Baltic countries during the Second World War when their territories were 
under Nazi occupation but they were recognized by the countries of the 
Alliance as their legitimate rulers, a role which they de facto take over after 
                                                 
6 Ibid, at 268.  
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the liberation. One more specific example for recognized sovereignty in 
absence of territory is the sovereignty managed by the “organization” also 
known as the Sovereign Military Order of Malta which to a certain extent 
but not completely is a de jure country more than de jure government. This 
“organization” had the power in Malta in the past but after its member was 
exiled from the island, they continue to exist in Rome. It is interesting that 
the Order is recognized as sovereign by a large number of countries, a 
situation that portraits the fact that it has established diplomatic relations 
with 103 countries and 6 entities subject to international law, among which 
is the European Union that has answered with reciprocity, meaning that they 
have established diplomatic relations with the Order. Besides the diplomatic 
relations, the Sovereign Military Order of Malts owns several buildings in 
the city of Rome which the Italian government had gave exterritorial statues 
meaning that within that territory/building the law of the Order is conducted 
and not of the state of Italy, a status which is exclusively reserved for the 
embassies of states. Additionally, the United Nations does not register the 
Order as a “country which is not a member” but as an entity that has 
received a valid invitation to participate as observer in the organization. 
Besides these typical state characteristics, the “organization” has its own 
army within the Italian army but an army that waves the flag and it is under 
the command of the Order, currency which has more of a collectors and 
symbolic than other usable purpose as well as it prints stamps that although 
they are not accepted everywhere, they are accepted by large number of 
European and world countries. 
De facto country is an entity that has a territory, population and 
sovereignty but lacks recognition to legitimately manage them by a larger 
number of countries. This is mostly the case due to the fact that the de facto 
country was previously part of another country that oppressed and 
challenged its sovereignty. Here we find the contact point between the 
characteristics of the statehood and the need of their recognition as 
legitimate by others already existing countries. There are many examples for 
de facto countries in the world among which are Taiwan which the People’s 
Republic of China considers part of their territory although it does not have 
real sovereignty over it and the case of Somaliland and Somalia, then to a 
certain degree Kosovo and Republic of Serbia and many more. 
IV. RECOGNITION OF COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The institute of “recognition of countries” is common but very 
important legal institute in the international law mainly due to the political 
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circumstances that determine it7. There is no specific rule to date according 
to which one country becomes internationally recognized and enjoys the 
right to statehood and the right to participate as equal to other countries in 
various international organizations 8 . There were attempts to establish 
universal criteria for obtaining the said statuses and possibilities but no one 
managed to affirm itself as relevant and respected by all countries in the 
world. There are two theories which study this issue9. The first one is the 
Declarative theory of statehood adopted at the conference in Montevideo10 
which is best summed up in the following sentence: “The political existence 
of one country is independent of its recognition by other countries”. 
According this theory for acquiring statehood, thus including the country in 
the international law as its entity, it is necessary for the country to 
encompass four elements: territory, population, sovereign authority and 
ability to manage the previous three. Having a look at the beginning of the 
text, it can be seen that the biggest part of the definition is taken over from 
the Westphalian Peace Treaty, meaning that it is not a novelty in the 
international but an already existing criterion that although recognized, it is 
not completely accepted and implemented without discrimination. 
The international law also encompasses the Constitutive theory of 
statehood. It studies the recognition of a country by other countries as 
instrumental for obtaining statehood and status of an entity of the 
international law of a new country. The views encompassed by the theory, 
which although formally is not widely accepted we can consider as realistic, 
are nicely captured in a though by L. Oppenheim stating: “The international 
law does not provide that one country does not exist until it is recognized by 
others but at the same time does not exist until it is recognized”.  
It can be concluded that the acquiring independence and international 
legal subjectivity by one state is formal and depends by its international 
recognition which is based on the will of other countries. 
Subliming the declarative positions of the countries on this topic but 
also the reality, it can be summed up that the recognition of one country as 
sovereign and as relevant entity of the international law is opened for 
interpretation, that there are no game rules in this field and that every 
existing country recognizes a new country at its own discretion and in 
                                                 
7 LJ. D. FRCHKOVSKI, V. TOPURKOVSKI & V. ORTAKOVSKI, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 58 
(Tabernakul Skopje 1995). 
8 More in: THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND 
EVOLUTION (Praeger Publishers 1999). 
9 More in: H. Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, NEW HAVEN CONN: YALE LAW 
JOURNAL (1944). 
10 More in: MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (1933). 
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accordance with its national interest thus not following some custom norms 
of the international conduct.  
V. RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND RECOGNITION OF COUNTRIES 
Since we established that the recognition of countries in the 
international law is an issue of a political decision, let’s review its methods11. 
Just as with the classification of the countries to de jure and de facto, both 
models also exist as methods for recognition. De jure recognition means 
adoption of a formal legal act—diplomatic note, law or declaration in the 
legislation house or by the government or president of state which publishes 
the recognition of one country by another through an official document12. 
This method is not ambiguous and does not leave any room for 
interpretation.  
The second method, the de facto method means establishment of 
political, economic and other type of relations. 
The differences between the first and second method are in the formal 
legal document which provides the rights and obligations and which is 
present in the first case but absent in the second. 
The de facto recognition is often used with a purpose to avoid violation 
of the bilateral relations with another country but at the same time to 
actually implement the recognition of the country in question. Types of 
relations between two countries that can be considered as a step towards 
recognition are the following: establishing diplomatic relations, visit by the 
head of state of the existing country to the country requesting recognition, 
signing of bilateral agreements between both parties and recognition of 
passports of the unrecognized country by the existing country. If one can 
take a look through history, there are cases where diplomatic 
communication between two countries, one of which is not internationally 
recognized, was necessary such as the case of establishing dialog between 
USA and the Palestinian movement for independence where in order to 
avoid informal message for recognition, the existing country explicitly 
states that its activities does not mean recognition of the country which 
establishes relations due to specific reasons. We have a similar example of 
Taiwan’s relations with large number of countries in the world. Although 
officially recognized and has diplomatic relations with 23 countries, 
unofficially the United States of America, Australia, Great Britain, France 
                                                 
11 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 35: 975—990 (Cambridge University Press 
(1986). 
12 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4(1): 66—71 (1993). 
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and many other countries have its offices under the cover of research and 
cultural centres and trade associations. 
According the doctrine introduced in the 1930s by the Mexican 
minister of foreign affairs, Genaro Estrada13, besides the previous two, a 
method for recognition of countries is also introduced. What is the 
difference? If the country has a policy to perform legal recognition, it means 
that it has to give a positive or negative statement regarding the recognition 
of the new government upon every unconstitutional change of power in one 
country 14 . The advantage of this policy is the possibility to revise the 
relations towards other countries upon every unconstitutional change but 
that mean interfering in its internal affairs by approving or disapproving 
with the changes made. The policy of secret recognition is a balance 
between the two doctrines and according to it the state is not obliged to 
evaluate the new government of another country but can confirm or revoke 
the recognition if desired. The third doctrine, which is used mostly 
nowadays, discusses recognition of countries instead of governments. 
According to it, if the first country has recognized the country where 
unconstitutional change of the government was made, it shall not revise the 
decision for recognition based exclusively on the change of regime. The 
advantages of this policy are far less administrative and bureaucratic 
procedure regarding the political changes in the world. While leaving space 
for manoeuvring in case of real need to reconsider the cooperation with the 
country where the change occurred is considered as disadvantage. 
We can consider the so called “collective recognition of countries” as a 
separate form of recognition which may occur through joint acceptance of 
membership of one country in the regional and universal international 
organization, through joint acceptance of a declaration of international 
convention or through formal procedure within the bodies of an 
international organization. 
The recognition of one country on international level is reflected 
through its membership in the Organization of the United Nations (UN)15. 
All dilemmas regarding the independence and sovereignty of any country 
are removed by becoming a member of this global organization. This is 
because in order for a country to become a member of this international 
institution it is necessary to be recognized by the five member-countries of 
                                                 
13 Genaro Estrada, http://www.biografiasyvidas.com/biografia/e/estrada_genaro.htm (last visited June 
2, 2016). 
14 Aneta Stojanovska, Process and Methods of Recognition of States in ANNUAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
FACULTY OF LAW, GOCE DELCHEV UNIVERSITY—SHTIP (ISSN 1857-7229) 267, 272 (2nd August 
Printing House—Shtip 2009). 
15 More in: Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, and on United Nations, www.un.org. 
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the Security Council, USA, Russia, China, Great Britain and France without 
whose decision (resolution) a membership is not possible. But it is 
important to be emphasized that there is no obligation (in the UN Charter) 
that obliges the member-countries, after the acceptance of a new country as 
member of UN, to establish “full political and legal recognition” by 
establishing bilateral diplomatic relations16. 
VI. PRECEDENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF COUNTRIES: THE 
CASE OF REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
The process of establishment and positioning of Republic of 
Macedonia on international plan through establishing communication, 
cooperation and becoming a member of international organization began at 
the same time with the process for independence of Republic of Macedonia 
in 1991. Republic of Macedonia became a member of the United Nations on 
April 7, 1993 and then of all agencies, programmes and funds of the UN 
system. Two years later, in 1995, Republic of Macedonia became member 
of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and 
the Council of Europe as well as other relevant regional organizations and 
initiatives. In the following years, Republic of Macedonia became a member 
of the World Trade Organization (2003), CEFTA (2006) and full member of 
the Francophonie (2006). 
During this period, Republic of Macedonia seeks to promote itself as 
responsible entity in the international relations, accepting the basic 
principles and goals from the UN Charter as basic postulates for its foreign 
policy. Regionally, it seeks to promote good neighbouring relations, 
cooperation and sustainable development of the region it belongs to. 
The case for admission procedure of Republic of Macedonia as a 
member of the United Nations is a precedent in the history of that 
organization. This precedent is important not only for the specific 
circumstances related with Republic of Macedonia but also as a possible 
negative example in the procedure, namely as mutual dependence between 
the legal and political evaluations in the bodies of the United Nations. In the 
admission procedure in UN bodies such as the Security Council, General 
Assembly of UN, the legal and more general political arguments did not 
dominate but it was imposed as a topic and an obstacle the political 
challenging of a member-country (Greece), which called upon the 
provisions from the Charter for keeping the peace and avoidance of creating 
                                                 
16 LJ. D. FRCHKOVSKI, V. TOPURKOVSKI & V. ORTAKOVSKI, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 61 
(Tabernakul Skopje 1995). 
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crises zones in the world, its political views towards Macedonia presented 
as possible threat to peace (the very existence of Macedonia at its northern 
borders) which actually arose to a bilateral dispute on a level of “procedural 
obstacle” in the United Nations.  
Bringing back of the issue with the recognition of Republic of 
Macedonia on collective manner, with the membership in the United 
Nations, was supplemented with another precedent, i.e. Republic of 
Macedonia is admitted for membership in the United Nations under the 
temporary “designation” as “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and 
with temporary removal of its official flag in front of the building and in the 
bodies of UN. This decision should be effective until final solution of the 
“dispute” with the procedure of its solution placed by the secretary general 
of the United Nations. 
The precedent is unpleasant for the organization of the United Nations 
because it refers to illegal and unfounded arising of a bilateral issue to a 
legal and procedural circumstance—obstacle in realization of the basic 
rights of one country to become international subject with full capacity17. In 
the case of Republic of Macedonia in the admission in UN, Republic of 
Macedonia was presented with two additional conditions of no legal 
character that directly violate the Charter: to descriptive name FYRoM to be 
accepted and to negotiate with Greece about its constitutional name18. The 
International Court of Justice, as one of the main bodies of the United 
Nations, in its history of existence had already considered the issue of 
imposing additional conditions for membership in the United Nations. In its 
advisory opinion from May 28, 1948 regarding the conditions for admission 
of a country as a member of the United Nations, the court took legal stand 
(contained in the ICJ Reports, 1948)19 that the requests stated in Article 4 
Paragraph 1 of the Charter regarding the membership “are exhausting 
numeration and therefore they are not given as managing principles or an 
example”. That means that if an applicant fulfils the four conditions from 
Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the Charter, that country should be admitted as a 
member of UN. According the mentioned court opinion from 1948, a 
country cannot be conditioned before its admission by previous recognition 
of elements of the legal entity, i.e. such conditioning imposes additional 
conditions which are opposite of Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the UN Charter 
                                                 
17 Ibid, at 61—62. 
18 ANETA STOJANOVSKA, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE FOREIGN 
POLICY, WITH SPECIAL OVERVIEW OF REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, Master Thesis, at 58.  
19 REPORTS OF JUDGEMNETS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS OF NTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1821.pdf (last visited October 2015).  
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and by imposing such conditions is UN Charter is being violated as the 
court stated. 
Through its foreign policy on bilateral and multilateral level—Republic 
of Macedonia promotes its national values and interest. The European and 
Transatlantic integration are of vital interest for the long-term stability, 
security and well-being of Republic of Macedonia, a country as a stable 
military partner of the Alliance.  
The process of recognition of Republic of Macedonia began in 1992. 
Diplomatic relations with total of 167 countries are established since then. 
Republic of Macedonia has established full diplomatic relations with the 
European Union on December 29, 199520. 
CONCLUSION 
With the conclusion of this theoretical overview, which refers to the 
international recognition of the countries in the international law, it is 
important to be emphasized that the recognition of the countries in the 
international law is common and very complex legal institute which is 
strongly determined by the political circumstances. While considering the 
recognition of one country by another and how that influences on its 
existence and operation, one comes to the most inaccurate part of the 
international law and customs. There is no specific rule to date according to 
which one country becomes internationally recognized and enjoys the right 
to statehood and the right to participate as equal to other countries in various 
international organizations 21 . There were attempts to establish universal 
criteria for obtaining the said statuses and possibilities but no one managed 
to affirm itself as relevant and respected by all countries in the world. 
The international relations are subject to regulation of the constitutional 
regulation because the national law depends of the international law. 
The best evidence for that are those constitutions that contain 
provisions for transferring part of the state sovereignty to the international 
institutions or envisage obligation for harmonization of the national legal 
order with the commonly accepted rules on international level. The mutual 
dependence between the national and international law is in the function of 
acting of the independent countries towards protection and promotion of 
world peace. 
 
                                                 
20 JUSTICIA, http://justicia.mk/novost.asp?cnd=96 (last visited June 1, 2016). 
21 GRANT THOMAS D., THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND EVOLUTION 
(Praeger Publishers 1999). 
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The state, in its full meaning is established after the three-year war in 
Europe and signing of the Westphalian Peace Treaty in 1948 that put the 
end of it. Since that date onwards, the creation and further development of 
the state has begun, as a whole that has the following characteristics: (a) 
constant population; (b) defined territory; (c) authority and (d) ability to 
establish relations with other countries. The rules that regulate the relations 
between citizens established with this kind of system, i.e. their rights and 
obligations towards the country were determined. Different forms of 
organization of the state authority are established depending on the historic 
tradition, realities in life, political events and general tendencies in that area. 
For every democratic country it is equally important to regulate and develop 
its national and international relations. 
The basic sources of international relations are the compulsory norms 
of the international law (jus cogens) and the legal principles recognized by 
the civilized nations. 
With the help of the compulsory norms of the international public law 
and the legal principles recognized by the civilized nations, the international 
relations of the countries become legal relations or value which are 
developed with the help of the law. In that context, the law appears as a 
factor for civilized development of the international relations. 
The regulations of the international public law are often violated, 
especially this is noticeable in a case of war when “the strong do what they 
have a power to do, and the weak do what they must accept”. 
Therefore, the recognition in the foreign policy is always followed by 
precedents. 
The case for admission procedure of Republic of Macedonia as a 
member of the United Nations is a precedent in the history of that 
organization. This precedent is important not only for the specific 
circumstances related with Republic of Macedonia but also as a possible 
negative example in the procedure, namely as mutual dependence between 
the legal and political evaluations in the bodies of the United Nations. In the 
admission procedure in UN bodies such as the Security Council, General 
Assembly of UN, the legal and more general political arguments did not 
dominate but it was imposed as a topic and as obstacle the political 
challenging of a member-country (Greece), which called upon the 
provisions from the Charter for keeping the peace and avoidance of creating 
crises zones in the world, its political views towards Macedonia presented 
as possible threat to peace (the very existence of Macedonia at its northern 
borders) which actually arose to a bilateral dispute on a level of “procedural 
obstacle” in the United Nations.  
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This article aims at exploring the unwillingness of the EU member 
states to sponsor a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) joint 
action within the EU framework as a response to the violence against 
civilians which erupted in Libya in 2011. It investigates the attitudes of 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy, as representative of the EU/27, toward 
the developments in Libya and a possible CSDP’s crisis-management 
operation. It discusses the assumption that the CSDP was prey to the 
member states’ wishes. The article avails itself of official documents from 
the UNSC, the European Union, EU laws, EU officials and prime ministers’ 
speeches, together with several interviews.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2011, Colonel Gaddafi’s use of force against civilians 
generated a severe crisis in Libya. A collective action was deemed necessary 
to stop violence. On 31 March, according to UNSC Resolution 1973, a crisis 
management mission was launched by NATO, the Unified Protector 
Operation. France, Britain and the US, with the support of American 
airpower and the Arab and European allies, participated in the collective 
action. The operation was a coalition of the willing, from which the US 
military, later, withdrew as agreed within the coalition. This article deals 
with the EU’s non-development of a crisis management intervention via its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a response to the 
emergency situation. The member states could have taken the initiative 
within the EU framework instead of leaving this to NATO. After a decade 
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of rapid development in terms of structure and deployment, the CSDP could 
have been operational in Libya. This article supports the assumption that the 
CSDP was prey to the member states’ wishes. It aims to offer an insight into 
the perceived unwillingness of the EU member states, specifically Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy as representative of the EU/27, to sponsor a joint 
action within the EU framework, as a reaction to the Libyan crisis in 2011. 
It avails itself of official documents from the UNSC, the European Union, 
EU laws, EU officials and prime ministers’ speeches, together with several 
interviews.  
I. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE CRISIS 
It is worth remembering that, a few days after the crisis arose in Libya, 
on 21 February, the 27 EU foreign ministers convened in the Council of the 
European Union, in Brussels, and requested an end to the violence. Shortly 
afterwards, France, Germany and The Netherlands proposed sanctions, 
whereas Malta, Cyprus and Italy were unwilling to endorse the proposal. In 
late February, the then Britain’s Prime Minister Cameron declared that the 
United Kingdom was preparing to arrange a no fly zone, possibly under 
NATO’s coordination. France expressly stated that it was keen to use 
NATO’s military command to “plan and execute air operations”. However it 
strongly believed that the North Atlantic Alliance should take no political 
control of the overall military operation. This would have alienated the Arab 
countries.1  
At the European Council meeting of 11 March, the EU states were 
addressed by France to recognise the Benghazi-based Transitional National 
Council (TNC). The previous day, former France’s President Sarkozy made 
a unilateral recognition of the TNC.2 Shortly afterwards, on 17 March, the 
UN Security Council approved the no-fly zone over Libya; it authorised all 
of the necessary measures to protect civilians.3 Sarkozy called a summit on 
Libya, in the French capital on 19 March. The meeting was tasked with 
organising the political guidance of the operation authorised by the UN. It 
was agreed with former America’s President Obama that the first offensive 
action would be conducted by the US. With the Operation Odyssey Dawn, 
the US would nullify Libya’s air defence system. Soon after having 
                                                 
1 “We are not at war”, says Prime Minister Fillon (France24, International News, 24 March 2011), 
available at http://www.france24.com/en/20110322-france-not-war-libya-fillon-prime-minister-
gaddafi- military-intervention-un-resolution.  
2 The Politics Behind France’s Support for Airstrikes on Libya (EurActiv, 11 March 2011), available 
at www.euractiv.com/...europe/politics-france-support-airstrik-.  
3 Resolution (1973) Security Council SC/10200 (17 March 2011). 
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achieved that aim, NATO would replace the American leadership. Such an 
arrangement was making clear that the direction of the operation was under 
non-USA authority.4  
On 20 March, French fighter jets opened fire on Gaddafi’s troops. The 
collective action that ensued, allowed by Resolution 1973, the Unified 
Protector Operation, was led by NATO. As the US retreated, attacks on 
ground targets were undertaken by the French, British, Italian, Danish, 
Belgian, Canadian, Emirati, Qatari and Norwegian armies. The EU’s lack of 
response to Libya is perceived as the result of the eroded influence of the 
EU structures, which have been affected by the nationalism of the member 
states. The latter’s unwillingness to sponsor a joint action within the EU 
framework was the emerged outcome. 
II. THE EU’S LACK OF A COMMON RESPONSE 
Not that a discussion was eluded by the EU states on the matter of 
whether a military operation could be taken as an initiative of the CSDP 
within the European structures. However, there was no sign of the “ambition 
in the field of military crisis management” that some Swedish defence 
ministers had previously predicted for the EU.5 Nor any indication surfaced 
regarding the so-called “tarzan” narrative, which the EU had constructed in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.6  
As late as 12 April, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in 
Luxembourg, a debate on whether the CSDP should intervene with armed 
forces occupied the agenda of the EU states. The meeting was held after the 
European Council had agreed, on 1 April, to the EUFOR Libya CSDP 
military mission. This one was anchored to the United Nation’s request to 
intervene in support of humanitarian assistance operations.7 An operational 
plan was needed for the military humanitarian intervention. The discussion 
on that matter, in Luxemburg, unveiled the contrasting positions of the 
foreign ministers. In particular, the claim emerged that the UN retained 
access to Misrata, which was under siege by Gaddafi’s forces, and an EU 
military action would have jeopardised the UN endeavours. Also, the 
                                                 
4 JOLYON HOWORTH, THE EUROPEAN UNION IN (IN) ACTION: BRUSSELS AND THE ARAB SPRING (2011), 
available at http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/615/articles/TheEuropeanUnioninInActionBrussels 
andtheArabSpring.pdf.  
5 Katarina Engberg, To Intervene or Not to Intervene? The EU and the Military Option in the 
Lebanon War of 2006, 11(4) PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 408—428 (2011).  
6 T. Trine Flockhart, “Me Tarzan—you Jane”: The EU and NATO and the Reversal of Roles, 12(3) 
PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 263—282 (2011).  
7 Council Decision 011/210/CFSP, EU Military Operation in Support of Humanitarian Assistance 
Operations in Libya, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (5 April 2011).  
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contention was advanced by the Italians that they could not understand the 
need for a military intervention to deliver humanitarian aid. The argument, 
outlined by others, that the deployment of forces was driven by a desire to 
demonstrate that the EU had a military planning capacity, distinct from that 
of NATO, was also aired. The indication that a military intervention was the 
only possible way to halt Gaddafi was, definitely, made. Concerned about 
the time-consuming decision to agree on when and how to end the military 
mission was also reportedly evident at the meeting. Apparently, 
disagreement about the EU being divided among the “do-gooders” and the 
“warriors” was impossible to restrain. In the end, a high level UN aid-and-
relief official’s letter to the then EU High Representative Ashton finally 
answered these objections. The letter disclosed the reservations about 
providing military support for a humanitarian mission.8 Hence, the military 
operation prospect vanished. 
By contrast, a few days after the EU foreign ministers met in 
Luxemburg, former France’s President Sarkozy and former Britain’s Prime 
Minister Cameron underwrote a letter. The missive was signed also by the 
former US President Obama and was published in the New York Times. It 
declared that “Gaddafi must go and go for good”.9  
III. REACTION TO LIBYA AND TO A POSSIBLE CSDP’S OPERATION FROM 
SOCIETY IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND GERMANY 
What was the reaction to the Libyan emergency by the member states 
and their societies at the time of the crisis? In Britain, society was more 
prone to repatriate their share of policy from Brussels than to tie in with the 
CSDP and its military.10 Concern about becoming embroiled in excessive 
bureaucracy and, perhaps on occasions, being obliged to depend on the 
policies and choices made by others11 did not favour a friendly vision of the 
CSDP, even with regard to Libya.  
In France, society was largely behind Sarkozy’s military initiative, with 
Parliament accepting the notion of a new era in the Mediterranean. 
Parliament has not rejected Sarkozy’s assertive role under the claim of 
                                                 
8 Toby Vogel, Split over Military Mission to Deliver Aid, EUROPEAN VOICE (14 April 2011), available 
at http:// www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/split-over-military-mission-to-deliver-
aid/70808.aspx.  
9 Libya’s Pathway to Peace, THE NEW YORK TIMES (14 April 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html.  
10 Cameron Rules Out EU Referendum, FINANCIAL TIMES, (21 May 2012). 
11 Author’s Interview with a Senior British official (London, November 2012).  
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further action in the CSDP.12 If questioned about the feasibility of a CSDP 
accomplishment in Libya, the French would respond that, above all, rapidity 
of action was important.13  
In Italy, society was, above all, concerned with former Prime Minister 
Berlusconi’s tardy reaction rather than with deserting the CSDP. However, 
soon after the crisis developed, Italian national broadcasters, such as La7, 
interviewed political observers. On those occasions, reference to the 
existence of a process to be put into motion especially in these 
circumstances, the CSDP, was made. To other political observers, the fact 
that “European nations” conducted the military intervention under the 
NATO’s lead was, by itself, a synonym for European unity. They rejected 
any preoccupation for bypassing the CSDP.14  
In Germany, society questioned the government’s non-alignment with 
its traditional allies rather than its weak connection with the CSDP as a 
civil-military actor.15 Yet, the usual emphasis on “non-attachment to the 
military CSDP” was downplayed as an approach which performed well with 
a certain electorate. It was expressed in Berlin’s Bundestag also concerning 
the case of Libya.16  
IV. REACTION TO A POSSIBLE CSDP’S OPERATION FROM EUROPEAN 
LEADERS: FRANCE, BRITAIN, GERMANY, ITALY AND THE EU 
Investigating the national and European leaders’ conduct in response to 
the crisis in terms of supporting a CSDP civil-military operation, further 
details emerge. In France, former President Sarkozy’s personal standing was 
at stake in view of the relatively soon national contest for the presidency 
(April 2012). France generally held the initiative within the CSDP, inspired 
by “Europe de la defence” ideas. On this occasion, it is unthinkable that 
Sarkozy did not wish to avoid suppressing France’s own interests and 
influence in Africa in the pursuit of a minimal European consensus.17 On 
previous occasions, France had already experienced the extent to which the 
CSDP lacked promptness of action. Regarding Chad, it had to make efforts 
                                                 
12 French Parliament Debates Libya Military Mission, FRANCE 24 INTERNATIONAL NEWS (22 March 
2011), available at www.france24.com/.../20110322-french-parliament-debates-li.  
13 Author’s Interview with a French Public Official (Rome and Lyon, May 2011). 
14 Author’s Interview with an Italian Political Scientist (Rome, RomaTre University, October 2011).  
15 Blast from the Past has Merkel on the Defensive, August 26, DAS SPIEGEL (18 March 2011), 
available at www.spiegel.de/.../letter-from-berlin-blast-from-the-past-has-merkel-.  
16 Author’s Interview with a German Security Analyst (Cardiff and Oxford, March 2013). 
17 Jean-Yves Haine, CSDP is dead. Long live CSDP!, XIX(1)THE BULLETIN OF THE PROGRAM IN 
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to convince the other member states to participate in the EU’s operation.18  
The project for an integrated Mediterranean area had been the focus of 
Sarkozy’s attention since 2008, reviving the idea of a Union of the 
Mediterranean. In March 2011, during the Libyan crisis, the then Prime 
Minister Fillon claimed, in the French Parliament, that “France want[ed] to 
see a new era in the Mediterranean region”.19 Sarkozy had already wasted 
time, and lost the opportunity for initiatives, during the previous challenge 
of the Tunisian unrest. His failure to respond to that crisis already 
overloaded his government with the dismissal of the Foreign Minister. He 
needed rapidity of action, and the CSDP was not congenial towards 
Sarkozy’s decision to oppose violence in Libya.  
In Britain, former Prime Minister Cameron’s decreasing domestic 
consensus on the uneasy handling of his coalition government challenged 
his position and reputation. Much of Cameron’s efforts were aimed at 
raising his standing by reinforcing his party. Perhaps Blair, the previous 
British Prime Minister, would have sought an initiative by his country in 
Europe, leading the CSDP to calm the violence in Libya, believing it to be a 
positive asset. Through his attempts to broaden his political basis, however, 
Cameron reignited Britain’s European political controversies. 
The promise of an in-out referendum on Europe, in 2017, if the 
Conservatives win the next general election had been aired as manifesto. 
Cameron could inconceivably be the promoter of a security operation in 
Libya within the CSDP. Yet, he was ready to intervene in Libya even 
without a UN resolution. The then European Security and Defence Policy 
was never mentioned in Britain’s 2010 national security strategy document. 
Soon after his election in May 2010, Cameron signed with Sarkozy a British 
defensive treaty with France, in November 2010. On that occasion, 
Cameron indicated that, through that agreement, the two leaders could “do 
more things alone as well as together”.20 By using the management of the 
Libyan crisis as an occasion for the joint operational and political leadership 
of these two states,21 instead of passing it to the EU, Cameron aimed to 
increase his reputation at home. 
In Germany, not very differently from the European counterparts, 
Chancellor Merkel was concerned about not jeopardising her position within 
                                                 
18 Jean-Yves Haine, The Failure of a European Strategic Culture—EUFOR Chad: The Last of Its 
Kind?, 32(3) CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 582—603 (2011).  
19 “We are not at war”, says Prime Minister Fillon, Op. Cit.  
20 Britain and France Sign Landmark 50-Year Defence Deal, THE GUARDIAN, (2 November 2010), 
available at www.theguardian.com›News›Politics›Defence policy. 
21 Jorge Benitez, Europe Needs a Military Avant-Garde, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, (3 April 201), available 
at www.acus.org/ natosource/europe-needs-miliary-avant-garde.  
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the party. Becoming involved in any process backing deployment was 
raising the question of how the electorate would react to it, in the upcoming 
elections in some states (18 September 2011). The Chancellor also faced 
parliamentarian opposition to her plans for the European Financial Stability 
Facility.22 Her party’s power was expected to be eroded. Merkel could not 
sponsor the CSDP to play a role in Libya. Apparently, the German 
“ontological” problems with security countered the “military connection”.  
This position was, however, paradoxical. As an opinion poll conducted 
on 22 June 2011 in EU countries and the US revealed, Germany was the 
first after the primacy of France to underwrite the military operation which 
actually took place outside the EU framework.23 A paradox was also the 
much-talked abstention, on 17 March, from UNSC Resolution 1973 
imposing the no-fly zone, which the EU also supported. Convinced human 
rights champion Chancellor Merkel aligned Germany with Russia and China, 
unquestionably no great human rights supporters. These paradoxes and the 
inability to compromise show that concessions, including championing the 
CSDP, were endangering Merkel’s domestic position.  
In Italy, former Prime Minister Berlusconi focused on avoiding, as far 
as possible, the disastrous personal impact that the situation in Libya was 
threatening to generate. His party and government had several consequences 
of the crisis to face. The development of an EU/CSDP operation was not the 
focus. In 2008, Berlusconi had agreed with Tripoli a friendship and 
cooperation treaty. The commitment that Italy would not consent to the use 
of its territory for any “hostile act” (or engage in “direct or indirect” military 
action) against Libya was made.  
The former prime minister feared that this conflict would have a 
negative impact on many Italian companies, which were partly owned by 
the Libyan government (e.g. FIAT SpA and UniCredit SpA). The Italian 
national energy corporation, Eni SpA, had been active for more than fifty 
years in Libya. More than 1,300 Italian workers had to be rescued from that 
country prior to any military action being taken.24 Berlusconi was concerned 
about the flow of Libyan migrants into Italy that, together with other 
problems, would damage his political party’s foundation. In addition, a 
quarter of Italy’s crude oil requirements where being supplied by Libya. 
This was a further motive confirming that any reference to military CSDP 
                                                 
22 Blast from the Past has Merkel on the Defensive, Op. Cit.  
23 Roberto Menotti, Verso i 100 giorni della NATO in Libia (Aspenia, 22 June 2011), available at 
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activity in Libya was far from what Berlusconi wanted.  
At the EU institutional level, also former EU High Representative 
Ashton appeared making no effort to enhance the reputation of the CSDP to 
challenge authoritarian Libya. Ashton’s attitude had not helped to generate 
support and make the EU/CSDP more influential. Ashton’s assertion, at the 
Corvinus University (February 2011), that the strength of the EU lay 
(paradoxically) in its inability to throw its weight around was a sign that 
Ashton wished to distance herself from a CSDP military mission.25  
Ashton was apparently obsessed with the problem of the “reality of 27 
member states who are sovereign, who believe passionately in their own 
right to determine what they do, particularly in the area of defence”.26 At the 
European Council emergency meeting of 11 March 2011, Ashton’s views 
prevailed when the EU leaders signed a communiqué that omitted any 
mention of the no-fly zone that was keenly sponsored by France and Britain. 
The communiqué sparked a furious debate. In London, “should [Baroness 
Ashton] not serve the member states of the European Union rather than 
pretending to lead them?” was the prevalent MPs’ accusation, which 
engaged former Prime Minister Cameron in a defensive debate in the 
Commons.27 Ashton was influenced, if not taken hostage, by the politics of 
Britain and France, with Cameron and Sarkozy covertly instructing her not 
to interfere in the military decision-making.28  
V. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY  
Taking the political control and strategic direction of the NATO 
military operation if the Berlin-Plus mechanisms had been used instead of 
leaving it to NATO was a missed opportunity. Not possessing the necessary 
military capabilities was watched with “anxiety” on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Also, it was branded by some as “the European culture of 
demilitarization”. 29  This hurdle was, nonetheless, lowered by the US 
granting assistance. In fact, the US support was important in the light of the 
                                                 
25 CATHERINE ASHTON, A WORLD BUILT ON CO-OPERATION, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY AND 
STABILITY (Corvinus University, Budapest, 25 February 2011), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/ 126.  
26 EUROPE’S FOREIGN POLICY IN LINE OF FIRE OVER LIBYA (24 March 2011), available at 
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27 David Cameron Mocks Cathy Ashton after “Rogue Briefing”, THE GUARDIAN (15 March 2011), 
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28 Author’s Interview with an EEAS Official (Brussels, November 2012).  
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lack of aircraft carriers, smart munitions and enablers of modern warfare, 
surveillance and air tanking.30 
The kind of setting of a Europe-led NATO command configuration 
was not new. It was defined, in the 1990s, as the European Security and 
Defence Identity, namely a NATO mission, conducted by the Europeans 
operating through US military resources. It was surpassed, in 2002, by the 
Berlin Plus arrangement, which allowed the CSDP to use NATO (i.e. US) 
assets to handle an operation without the involvement of US forces.31 The 
Berlin Plus mechanisms were successfully used in Operation Concordia in 
Macedonia, in 2003.32 They were indeed offering a more “European” option 
to mark the operation in Libya. Specifically, even though the military action 
was implemented under NATO command, the member states’ choice to 
resort to the Berlin-Plus procedures would have allowed the CSDP to 
undertake strategic control of the military action.  
CONCLUSION  
This article aimed to investigate the reluctance of the EU member 
states to promote a Common Security and Defence Policy joint action 
within the EU framework to stop the violence against civilians in Libya in 
2011. Its outline of the political context of the crisis showed how the action 
evolved along a course that differed from the use of the mechanisms 
foreseen by the European Union laws. This allowed the formation of a crisis 
management intervention by the EU/Common Security and Defence Policy 
that contributed toward calming down violence such as that which 
developed at Europe’s southern boundary. The article’s discussion of the 
way in which the EU member states debated the options on the table, while 
at the European Council, made clear their several excuses for opposing an 
intervention with armed forces from the CSDP. Also, the overview of the 
reactions to Libya’s developments both from societies and the member 
states’ leaders in Britain, France, Germany and Italy, as representative of the 
EU/27, highlighted the evidence that the CSDP raised no interests on that 
occasion. Refusing to follow the policy choices made by others, paying 
excessive importance to the rapidity of action, attempting to broaden their 
political basis, harboring preoccupations regarding the upcoming political 
elections, and, not last being overcome by the fear of a negative impact on 
                                                 
30 Nick Witney, How to Stop the Demilitarisation of Europe, ECFR POLICY BRIEF (2011), available at 
www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR40_DEMILITARISATION_BRIEF_AW.pdf.  
31 Jolyon Howorth, The European Union in (in)action, Op. Cit.  
32 Catriona Mace, Operation Concordia: Developing a “European Approach to Crisis Management”, 
11(3) INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 474—490 (2004). 
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the flourishing commercial activities with Libya, were testified, by this 
article, as multiple causes which militated against the CSDP’s action. Also, 
the role played by the former EU High Representative emerged, from the 
analysis, as submissive to the member states’ policy, particularly that of 
Britain and France. The article’s discussion of the member states’ 
unexplored opportunity to employ the Berlin-Plus arrangement that would 
have allowed the CSDP, supplemented by US assets, to take strategic 
control of the military action, confirmed their apparent low inclination 
toward developing the CSDP’s policy. The article proved the truth of the 
assumption that the CSDP was being prey to the member states and their 
wishes regarding the specific circumstance of responding to the troubles that 
arose in Libya. It demonstrated that the lack of a common response via the 
CSDP was mainly influenced by the EU states’ domestic affairs. Ultimately, 
national preoccupations, concerns and interests gained the upper hand, 
expressed their disinterest in a common action within the EU framework 
and conveyed a sense of a collapsed CSDP.  
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This research traces the rule of law, and judicial independence in 
Egypt during the transition to democracy after the Arab Spring in light of 
the complicated realities of nation’s centralized system over the past seven 
thousand years where the discretion of the ruler and the interests of the 
ruling elites prevailed. In this article, the author asserts that Egypt’s law 
has long been recognized not only as a reflection of the prevailing forces in 
the society, but also as a strong instrument of the authoritarian ruler who 
presides over a centralized government structured to regulate and protect 
Egypt’s Nile river resources from outside enemies. This trend has been 
followed after 1952 revolution’s military rulers to date. The five 
authoritarian Presidents with military background (Naguib-1952 to 1954, 
Nasser-1954 to 1970, Sadat-1970 to 1981, Mubarak-1981 to 2011 and 
currently, Al-Sisi-2013 to date) operate in a legalistic environment which 
allowed them to use legal tools and shift tactics in their efforts to use the 
law to enhance their executive privileges by satisfying the military 
corporate interests. This tendency has compromised judicial independence 
and empowering judges to use law as an instrument of change and tool for 
progressive economic and social development. The author argues that the 
Egyptian constitutional context under the five military rulers ruled does not 
translate into principles of law-abiding governmental powers, independent 
courts, transparency of legislation, and judicial review of the 
constitutionality of laws, but the wishes of the ruler and his power base-the 
military. The period following the two revolutionary waves of January 25, 
2011, and June 30, 2013 witnessed an increasing development toward 
respecting the rule of law in the form of an efficient enforcement of judicial 
decisions, trying the two former Presidents-Mubarak and Mursi and their 
entourage before courts of law rather than special courts, and increased 
promotion of freedom of expression. 
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INTRODUCTION: LAW & PROGRESSIVE CHANGE 
Absence of rule of law was a central reason for the Egyptian revolution 
on January 25, 2011. Egypt’s law has long been recognized not only as a 
reflection of the prevailing forces in a given society but also as a potential 
instrument of change and progressive development. These two attributes, 
Ibrahim  Shehata (1997) argued, enabled it to play seemingly contradictory 
roles in society: that of a keeper and interpreter of the status quo and, 
simultaneously, that of a catalyst for its change and the mechanism through 
which such a change may be brought about in an orderly manner.1 Rules, 
however, are seldom self-executing and even when they are, they need 
appropriate institutions to ensure their correct application and enforcement 
and to settle disputes which inevitably arise in the course of their 
application.2 The Egyptian legal system like all legal systems consists not 
only of applicable rules but also of the processes through which these rule 
are to be applied and of the institutions in charge of these processes. 3 
Without such processes and institutions, rules may remain abstract concepts 
which do not always reflect the law in force.4 
The Egyptian revolutionary waves of January 25, 2011 and June 30, 
2013 provided an opportunity to introduce the most appropriate and liberal 
changes toward the rule of law and judicial independence under the current 
circumstances of the Egyptian society. Liberalism according to Nathan 
Brown (1997) has played a role in Egyptian legal history, and the Egyptian 
judiciary has at times emerged as a force for liberal legality and it served to 
support existing political authority.5 The changes must also include such 
legislative, administrative and judicial reforms as may be needed to insure 
that the rules will be changed to serve the Egyptian people public interest, 
                                                 
1 IBRAHIM SHIHATA, COMPLEMENTARY REFORM, ESSAYS ON LEGAL, JUDICIAL AND OTHER 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS SUPPORTED BY THE WORLD BANK 55 (London/Boston: Kluwer Law 
International 1997). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, at 56. 
4 Ibid. 
5 NATHAN BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 236 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1997). 
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will be applied by an independent judiciary in a correct and fair manner so 
that they may continue to serve this purpose, will be complemented by the 
necessary regulations and interpretations which facilitate their application 
and will be subject to future reviews to ensure their continued relevance and 
usefulness.6  
The purpose of this research is to investigate the following two 
research questions:  
(a) How did Egypt’s authoritarian Presidents, with military background 
since 1952 revolution to date, operate in a legalistic environment which 
allowed them to use legal tools and shift tactics in their efforts to use the law 
to advance their military corporate interests without empowering 
independent judges?  
(b) What are the challenges confronting judicial independence and the 
rule of law during the transition to democracy in Egypt after the two 
revolutionary waves of January, 25, 2011 and June 30, 2013?  
I. THE NASSER, SADAT, MUBARAK REGIMES & THE RULE OF LAW 
The “Rule of Law” according to Otis Stephens, John Scheb and Colin 
Glennon (2015) is the idea that law, not the discretion of officials should 
govern public affairs7. The “Rule of Law”, sometimes called the “Supremacy 
of Law,” has been understood by some to generally indicate that decisions 
should be made by the application of known principles or laws without the 
intervention of the ruler’s discretion in their application8. The “Rule of Law” 
in terms of constitutional law was invoked by English writers as early as the 
12th and 13th centuries to restrain the powers of monarchs, and was 
articulated in the Massachusetts Constitution (Part the First, Article XX of 
1780) which spelled out the principles of separation of powers “to the end 
[the government] may be a government of laws, and not of men”9 . In 
modern constitutional law, the “rule of law” translates into the principles of 
law-abiding governmental powers, independent courts, transparency of 
legislation, and judicial review of the constitutionality of laws and other 
                                                 
6 IBRAHIM SHIHATA, COMPLEMENTARY REFORM, ESSAYS ON LEGAL, JUDICIAL AND OTHER 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS SUPPORTED BY THE WORLD BANK 56 (London/Boston: Kluwer Law 
International 1997). 
7 Otis H. Stephens, Jr., John M. Scheb II & Collin Glennon, American Constitutional Law, Volume II 
Civil Rights and Liberties D-21 (Stamford: Cengage Learning 2015). 
8 IBRAHIM SHIHATA, COMPLEMENTARY REFORM, ESSAYS ON LEGAL, JUDICIAL AND OTHER 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS SUPPORTED BY THE WORLD BANK 5 (London/Boston: Kluwer Law 
International 1997). 
9 Ibid. 
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norms of lower order10. 
Generally, there are two main schools of thought: the instrumental 
interpretation school and the substantive interpretation school, according to 
Ahmed Eldakak (2012).11 The instrumental interpretation school, rule of law 
basically refers to the existence of a legal system in which there are rules, 
and these rules are followed. In other words, rule of law means “how to do 
things with rules”.12 The actual content of the rules is less important than the 
actual existence of the rules themselves. Rule of law in this context is about 
the “formal and structural components, rather than the substantive content 
of the laws”. Such rules need to be public, understandable, non-
contradictory, and non-retroactive. Accordingly, such rules are not 
necessarily fair ordemocratic. Therefore, a legal system that does not 
recognize the most basic human rights can still claim to be governed by rule 
of law.13 The substantive interpretation approach also requires the existence 
of a set of rules that are followed. However, under the substantive approach, 
such rules must have essential goals that represent the desired end-state of 
the society14. The goals under this view are “making the state abide by law, 
ensuring equality before the law, supplying law and order, providing 
efficient and impartial justice, and upholding human rights.” 15 
Consequently, a legal system that does not respect basic human rights, 
suchas freedom of speech, cannot claim to be governed by rule of law. 
Notably, the United Nations adopted a substantive approach in its rule of 
law definition: 
Rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to 
the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the 
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and 
legal transparency.16  
The United Nations’ adoption of the substantive interpretation 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ahmed Eldakak, Approaching Rule of Law in Post-Revolution Egypt, 18(2) U.C. DAVIS JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 261—307 (2012). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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approach signifies an international agreement that substantive interpretation 
is superior to instrumental interpretation. Accordingly, this article adopts the 
substantive interpretation of rule of law.17 
II. EGYPT’S GEOGRAPGHY & ITS IMPACT ON JUDICIARY INDEPENDENCE 
Egypt’s geographic location dictated the establishment of an 
authoritarian regime to rule rather than to govern via the rule of Law. 
Archaeologists have dated signs of organized human habitation in the fertile 
Nile Valley that forms the heart of Egypt to over 6,000 years ago, and the 
signs of fabled Land of the Egyptian Pharaohs go back over 7,000 years18. 
The heart of Egypt has been the Nile river valley, which early in human 
history made Egypt an agricultural supplier to many of the world’s 
surrounding and competing powers and formed the basis of the Pharaoh’s 
empire that prospered into biblical times. These geographic circumstances 
required the development of authoritarian centralized institutions to govern 
the creation, maintenance and policing of a sophisticated irrigation system. 
However, the aforementioned bases of Egyptian ascendancies have 
simultaneously and perplexingly been a blessing and a curse. While the 
abundance of the Nile allowed Egypt to flourish, it also meant outsiders cast 
a frequently resentful and greedy eye on Egypt. When the rulers and their 
central institutions policing the state weakened due to internal power 
struggle among the ruling elite or when the central authority’s exercise of 
policing power over its population, geographical territories and borders 
relaxed—the result was invasion and conquest that disturbed the country 
well into the 19th and 20th century with a British occupation for seventy 
two years, from 1882 to 195419. 
The aforementioned mix of geography and Egypt’s historical 
circumstances has its profound impact on the rule of law, and Judiciary 
represented by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) which administers justice, 
judicial independence, and the judge’s ability to apply and interpret the law. 
Both the MOJ and the judges presiding at the judiciary benches are at the 
mercy of the executive branch’s powerful arm- the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) which administers the state’s police power, enforcing judicial 
decisions/verdicts and provides personal protection to Judges. Hence, the 
Egyptian Judiciary since the dawn of history is heavily centralized, heavily 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 ELLEN LUST (ED.), THE MIDDLE EAST, 14TH EDITION 424—453(Thousand Oaks, Sage-CQ Press 
2017). 
19 Ibid. 
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controlled by the executive branch of government and submits to the ruler- 
King or President who represents the will of the state. 
III. RULE OF LAW DURING NASSER’S REGIME 
The 1952 revolution led by the charismatic leader Gamal Abdel Nasser 
left the judicial system intact, and enabled their top leadership of the 
judiciary to double their income by allowing them to held teaching positions 
at the only Police Academy in the country under the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) the most powerful arm of the executive branch. Nathan Brown (1997) 
argued that historical development of these era from 1954 to 1970 (the end 
of Nasser’s regime) indicates that there were several major confrontations 
with one important component of the Egyptian judiciary branch that is 
Majlis al-Dawla, or Council of State 20 . It is this judicialbody which 
championed the institutionalization of liberal legality in Egypt during the 
1940s under the leadership of Abdul Razak al-Sanhuri- gifted Jurist 21 . 
Majlis al-Dawla is a judicial body responsible for reviewing any new 
legislation prior to enacting it by the parliament. Also, responsible of 
adjudicating disputes between the government and individuals, or between 
two government agencies22. It is equivalent to the administrative courts in 
the United States.  
In 1954 according to Enid Hill, the Majlis al-Dawla was attacked and 
its Chief Justice (al-Sanhuri) forced to retirement from public life23. Nathan 
J. Brown in his seminal work on “The Rule of Law in the Arab World, 
Courts in Egypt and the Gulf”, noted that Majlis al-Dawla initially assisted 
the Free Officers took power in July 1952. When the officers formed a 
Regency Council to take the place of the ousted King Faruq, the Majilis al-
Dawla provided a legal formula that obviated the need to present the 
measure to the disbanded parliament (as was constitutionally required)24. 
The Majilis al-Dawla thus worked out a relationship with the ruling military 
officers (members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)—the de 
facto legislative body), based on the assumption that the authoritarian 
measures taken by the new regime were emergency measures and that full 
constitutional and parliamentary life would soon be restored25.  
                                                 
20 The Rule of Law in the Arab World, 73—76. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 IBRAHIM OWEISS (ED.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY EGYPT 240—259 
(Washington DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University 1990). 
24 The Rule of Law in the Arab World, 73—76. 
25 Ibid. 
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The years of 1953 and early 1954 witnessed also, another attempt to 
increase the institutionalization of liberal legality championed by Majlis al-
Dawla’s Chief Justice al-Sanhuri took place in the drafting of a new 
republican constitution 26 . However, the RCC which was composed of 
military officers decided to move beyond forcing the abdication of King 
Faruq to abolishing the monarchy altogether, it appointed a body of legal 
and political experts to draft a new constitution27. Al-Sanhuri proved to be 
among the most influential members of the committee which nearly 
completed a very liberal and democratic document.28 
The draft would granted women the right to vote and established a 
supreme constitutional court to protect the constitution (over the objection 
of Makram Ubayd, a powerful Wafdest politician—another member of the 
committee who argued that this would infringe the prerogatives of the 
legislature)29. A parliament was to be established with al-Sanhuri arguing 
for a strong measure of popular participation in electing its members. Work 
proceeded fairly quickly at first, and by August of 1953 al-Sanhuri promised 
that the draft would be completed within months, making an extension of 
Military rule via the RCC30. 
When the faction led by Khalid Mohi Aldeen and Naguib within the 
RCC which supported and favored the return to constitutional life, were 
defeated in the March 1954 crisis, the fate of the new constitution was 
sealed31. While the Majilis al-Dawala was not an active participant in the 
conflict between who favored the return to parliamentary life and those 
supported the continuation of the RCC (which controls both legislative and 
executive authorities), it was clear where its sympathies lay. At the end of 
March 1954, a demonstration organized by supporters of the military’s rule 
turned violent when al-Sanhuri’s office was stormed and al-Sanhuri was 
assaulted by members of the military police32. Nasser’s faction won, al-
Sanhuri was removed from his position as Chief Justice of Majlis al-Dawla. 
Followed by sending, Kaled Mohi Al-deen to permanent exile abroad (in 
Switzerland), and Nagub was placed under house arrest from 1954 to the 
remainder of Nasser regime, September 1970, without trial33. 
In 1955, another attack against the Majlis al-Dawla came to bring it 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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more closely within the executive branch supervision, but this effort was 
frustrated because of the judges resistance, according to Enid Hill34. The 
final assault came in 1969, with the so-called “Massacre of the Judges”, 
when a substantial number of the judges were in effect fired. And a new 
body to supervise judicial appointments, controlled by the Ministry of 
Justice, was established. And Nasser prevailed. When Nasser wanted to 
force certain public policies about basic political or socioeconomic changes 
the judiciary was just bypassed. Special revolutionary courts were set up for 
special purposes; there were also experimentation with “popular courts.”35 
Another means of exercising executive influence on the judiciary was 
through a comprehensive Emergency Law legislated in 1958 by the first 
elected parliament since the 1952 revolution. The Parliament’s Speaker 
Abdul Latef al-Bagdady is one of the original Free Officers Corps. When he 
or any one from the Free Officers Corp ran in his electoral district for 
election in the parliament—called the People’s Assembly, no other person 
was allowed to run. Under this Emergency Law, various statutory 
procedural protections for the defendants are not applicable, various acts 
(otherwise allowed) are designated as crimes, and certain crimes specified in 
the penal code are subject to harsher penalties36. Parallel with the 1958 
Emergency Law, State Security Courts staffed by Military judges were 
established to prosecute “political” crimes committed by civilians 37 . 
Military prosecutors were given the police power (al-Dabtia al-Kadaia.) 
Likewise the military police and its affiliated the Criminal Military 
Investigation Administration (Edaret al-Mabahech al-Gnaaih al-Askaria). 
These measures were directed mainly against the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB), the most disciplined, organized, and militant social and political 
movement existed in Egypt since 1928 to date-2017.  
Only in the late 1960s, in the last years of Nasser’s presidency, did the 
regime mount a concerted efforts to bring the judiciary under firm 
presidential control: A new “Supreme Court” was created by decree and 
staffed by presidential appointments after thorough background check about 
their attitude toward the regime by three security agencies. A “Supreme 
Council of Judicial Organization” was given authority over administrative 
matters as well as appointments and promotions within the judicial ranks 
and effectively placed under executive oversight.38 
                                                 
34 The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, 242. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 The Rule of Law in the Arab World, 73—76. 
38 Nathan Brown, Egypt’s Judges in a Revolutionary Age 1-14 (Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace-The Carnegie Papers 2012). 
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IV. RULE OF LAW DURING SADAT’S AND MUBARAK’S REGIMES 
Presidents Sadat and Mubarak both came from the military institution, 
but lack Nasser’s popular charisma relied heavily on the military and 
security agencies as a source of their power and legitimacy to rule, but not 
to govern. Yet over the next four decades, Nasser’s two successors, Anwar 
Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, the State Security Courts remained in addition to 
a new exceptional court was created by Sadat in 1980: the “Court of 
Values”39. In addition to another exceptional jurisdiction utilized by Sadat 
and used by Mubarak which is the “Socialist Prosecutor”. The Socialist 
Prosecutor is appointed by the president of the republic and directly 
responsible to him. His office serves as the executive’s arm for 
investigations and for the preparation of accusations independent of the 
judicial apparatus. The aforementioned measures built by Nasser, followed 
and strengthened by Sadat and cemented by Mubarak long reign of 30 years 
totalitarian role resulted in the continuation of legal and judicial system in 
Egypt with the purpose of providing support for the political-heavily 
centralized hierarchal structure build by Nasser. And to be an integral part 
of an effort to build a stronger, more effective, more centralized, and more 
intrusive police state. The result was an absent of the Rule of Law known to 
civil societies, and led Egypt to become close to a failing state. 
Tamir Moustafa (2012) work on the Egyptian judiciary proffers that, 
“under the credible commitment thesis, authoritarian regimes with 
longertime horizons (like the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak regimes) are 
morelikely to provide the judiciary some independence to provide 
assurancesto much needed domestic and international investments” 40 . 
Moustafa argues that the Sadat and Mubarak regime were compelled to 
allow more political liberalization, including rule of law and limited judicial 
independence, as a source of legitimacy to offset their regime’s failure to 
sustain the high levels of public benefits provided by the Nasserregime. To 
survive economically, the state had no choice but tosubstitute political rights 
for welfare rights due to its inability to provide employment, health service, 
and food subsidies. The regime used judicial mechanisms to absorb the 
public’s anger over increasing political corruption from the ruling elite. By 
having courts issuerulings striking down certain laws as a means to privatize 
the economy and shrink subsidies, the executive redirected the public’s 
                                                 
39 The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, 242. 
40 TAMIR MOUSTAFA, DRAFTING EGYPT’S CONSTITUTION: CAN A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK REVIVE A 
FLAWED TRANSITION? 1—11 (Washington DC: Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Project on Arab 
Transitions 2012). 
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anger toward the judiciary. As more judges were motivated by both self-
preservation and a conviction to do the government’s political bidding, the 
judiciary itself became politicized. The result is the judicialization of 
politics.41 The author believe that there are four conditions that incentivize 
long term authoritarian regimes such as Egypt to show to the outside world 
some tolerance to judicial independence, first, lack of traditional legitimacy 
or charismatic sources of legitimacy; second, inability to provide welfare 
goods such as economic and social services that have been provided in the 
past; third, a weak international or regional role; and fourth, popular support 
of the judiciary based on perceptions of judges as professionals, independent, 
and concerned political actors. The absence of the aforementioned 
conditions under Mubarak compelled his regime to allow for some 
restrained judicial independence. For instance, Mubarak was notoriously 
uncharismatic and his incremental removal of subsidies due to pressures by 
international lenders incentivized him to judicialize politics by shifting some 
of the political backlash onto a quasi-independent judiciary. When the 
judiciary leveraged its limited independence to issue rulings that preserved 
civil liberties and the electoral process, popular support for the judiciary 
arose. This made it more costly for Mubarak to overtly eliminate judges’ 
independence. Finally, the disreputable emergency law is one common tool 
used by the former regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak that disregarded 
the rule of law by amending the constitution to promote the rule of the 
president, issuing laws that served the interests of the president’s entourage-
the military, not enforcing judicial decisions, restricting freedom of speech, 
and concentrating power in the hands of the executive branch over the 
legislative branch and the Judiciary. 
V. RULE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDANCE AFTER THE JANUARY 25, 
2011 REVOULTION 
The period following the two revolutionary waves of January 25, 2011, 
and June 30, 2013, witnessed an increasing trend toward respecting the rule 
of law, through changes such as enforcement of judicial decisions to remove 
private properties build on public land, trying the two former Presidents 
(Mubarak, and Mursi) and their entourage before courts of law (rather than 
special courts), and increased promotion of freedom of expression. However, 
several serious obstacles to promoting rule of law remain after the two 
revolutionary waves. One of the Deep State’s tools is still fully penetrating 
the judiciary branches as a result of allowing Ex-police officers to join the 
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judicial bench due to their equal legal education with judges. Ex-police 
officers constitute approximately 1/5 of the current judges according to a 
former General in the Egyptian police who asked not to be identified by 
name. Also according to one of the world’s leading experts on Egyptian and 
international law UN war crimes specialist and Nobel Peace Prize nominee, 
Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni. Dr. Bassiouni tells the International Bar 
Association (IBA) Global Insight, that:  
the unprecedented sentencing to death of 529 Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters on 24 March, 2014 has prompted much-needed scrutiny of the 
Egyptian judiciary. It has been undermined by poorly trained former police 
officers’ and is in urgent need of reform, over the past two decades; around a fifth 
of judges may have passed through the ranks of the police force, compromising 
their independence and integrity. This is an anomaly in any legal system that you 
create a career path opening by going to the police academy. The Police 
Academy has become a path for people who did not have good enough grades to 
get into law school or because of some relations their parents might have had 
with the authorities. You might call it an infiltration of the judiciary. The 
deteriorating professionalstandard of the police has had a direct impact on the 
quality of the judiciary.42 
Bassiouni explains further by arguing that:  
Many have accepted the higher standards of the judiciary, but many have 
remained with the original police culture. For a large number, their training and 
standards leave much to be desired. The shock ruling—on charges including 
murdering a policeman and violent attacks on people and property—was made 
after just two hearings, in which the defendants’ lawyers complained they had no 
chance to examine the evidence.43 
Santiago A. Canton, Director of Robert Kennedy’s Center of Partners 
for Human Rights, criticized the aforementioned court ruling. He calls for 
the annulment of the death sentences handed down to over 500 individuals 
in Egypt and for the need to safeguard due process of law protections during 
trials and Last Monday, after a mass two-day trial, a judge in the Minya 
criminal court sentenced 529 people to death for crimes related to violence 
against the Matay police station and the death of its deputy police chief, 
Colonel Mustafa Ragab 44 . According to media and NGO sources, the 
defendants face charges including the murder of a police officer and attempt 
to kill two others, vandalism, seizing weapons, unlawful public gathering, 
                                                 
42 Rebecca Lowe, Egypt: Judiciary Undermined by Badly Trained Ex-Police, INTERNATIONAL BAR 
ASSOCIATION’S GLOBAL INSIGHT (April 2, 2014). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Santigo A. Canton, Director of Robert F. Kennedy’s Center of Partners for Human Rights (June 21, 
2014). 
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and belonging to an illegal organization. The last charge is in reference to 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which was designated as an unlawful organization 
in December 2013, four months after the incident took place.45 The scale of 
these death sentences is unique and unparalleled; furthermore, it sets a 
dangerous precedent in Egypt’s application of law. The proceedings violated 
a range of Egypt’s international human rights obligations with respect to a 
fair trial, in particular articles 6 and 14 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and articles 4 and 7 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. The trial proceedings also violated several 
provisions of Egypt’s new constitution, including articles 95, 96, and 98. 
According to civil society and news reports, the procedural irregularities 
included the absence of most of the defendants from the trial, the defense 
lawyers’ denied access to the court, the lack of witnesses called to stand, the 
lack of relevant evidence presented that implicates any individual defendant, 
and the potential application of an ex post facto law46. 
Human Rights Watch reported on June 21, 2012 and December3, 2014 
that “Five hundred people have been sentenced to Capital Punchment. The 
Grand Mufti must annul this judgment immediately”.47 The cases are sent to 
the GrandMufti who will decide whether the death sentences will be 
confirmed, as per Egyptian law. That same day, the Minya criminal court 
will render the verdict in another mass trial against 683 people, including 
the MB’s Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie, for similar charges in 
connection with an attack on a separate police station. Additionally, two 
other trials have been ordered for 919 suspected MB supporters for charges 
that include murder for some of the accused for using force used during the 
sit-in dispersals on August 14, 2013, when over 600 people died, have not 
been prosecuted. In addition, only four police officers have been convicted 
for the deaths of 37 detainees, who died of asphyxiation while being 
transported to a prison on August, 18, 2014. One of the police officers was 
given a 10-year sentence while the other three were given one-year 
suspended sentences. This implementation of mass trials is being targeted at 
perceived critics and opponents of the government, and speaks to a larger, 
worrying trend of the backsliding of the rule of law in Egypt. 48  The 
Egyptian court system is overwhelmed with a back log of cases due to the 
vast number of arrests. Many of those arrested are supporters of the MB, but 
the detained also include secular activists and journalists. According to 
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46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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senior interior ministry officials, 16,000 people have been arrested in recent 
months. 
Santiago A. Canton reported that “The use of mass trials does not bode 
well for the thousands of others who await their day in court”. “Dissidents 
from various affiliations and journalists have been rounded up in droves 
since last summer. With so many in prison, it begs the question of whether 
Egypt is truly moving forward in democratic and inclusive manner”, or 
moving toward a Failing State or a Soft State?49 
VI. THE NEED TO REALIZE THE RULE OF LAW, AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
DURING THETRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
Undoubtedly, the two revolutionary waves of January 25, 2011 and 
June 30, 2013 had a great impact on the promotion of rule of law as a 
concept, and that Egypt’s political system is moving forward toward some 
sort of democracy suitable for the Egyptian culture and the country’s 
complicated economic and social development realities50. The Egyptian new 
form of democracy may not be squared with or to be identical to other well 
known Western democracies, but hopefully will preserve the Egyptian State 
from collapsing as what happened in other countries of the Arab spring such 
as Libya, Syria or Yemen. The following can be seen as a positive 
development according to Ahmed Eldakak (2012): 
First: The trying of the two former Presidents Mubarak and Mursi and 
their associates before courts of law rather than a special court is a positive 
sign of progress toward the rule of law. As Montesquieu once stated, “[l]aw 
should be like death, which spares no one.” Mubarak’s trial particularly is a 
positive development for the rule of law in Egypt. Despite several 
developments that had cast serious doubts on the success of the trial, it 
marked the first time in Egyptian history that a former ruler was brought 
before courts of law. This pursuit of legal justice is what differentiates the 
2011 Egyptian Revolution from the 1952 revolution where members of the 
former regime were tried before special court composed of all military 
officers without fairtrials. Giving a trial to a dictator who caused the death 
of hundreds of heroic innocents during the Revolution is one of the most 
effective first steps towards establishing full rule of law the essence of 
democracy. 
Second: An important development that echoed the evolution of rule 
oflaw is when Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the head of the 
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2017              THE RULE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL             307 
 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), received subpoena to testify 
during Mubarak’s trial. Before the Revolution, it was hard to imagine that 
senior members in the regime would appear before a court to testify. In 
Mubarak’s trial, senior members of the new regime were required to testify, 
including: the Army Field Marshal, the Chief of the Intelligence 
Organization, and the Minister of Interior. These subpoenas indicated the 
first time in the history of the Egyptian judiciary that people in such high 
positions of executive power could be obliged to testify before a court of 
law. Mubarak’s trial sends a clear message that the rule of man has ended 
and the rule of law has rematerialized. The remaining challenge is how to 
establish a full rule of law that will fulfill the expectations of Egyptian 
society today after the great human sacrifices during the first revolutionary 
wave of January 25, 2011.  
Third: After the revolution, judges set to work drafting a law that 
would likely have support of all political forces. They worked to legitimate 
a more powerful Supreme Judicial Council, rendering it freer of executive 
oversight and transferring to the council functions that currently belong to 
the Ministry of Justice. Even the indirect ways of influencing judges, such 
as doling out attractive secondments, would be placed in judicial rather than 
executive branch hands. The effect would be to make the judiciary as a body 
far more self-directed in terms of administration, budgeting, and personnel.  
This is a goal that not one person would question in the post-
revolutionary atmosphere. 
Fourth: After the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) attempted to regain its control over judicial 
appointments. While the details of its interactions with the SCAF are 
unknown, it won an important concession from SCAF with the decree law 
on SCC appointments, which gives SCC judges an important role in 
appointments decisions and limits the President’s choices regarding 
candidates. During the last constitution-drafting process, the SCC indicated 
its displeasure with proposed articles on the judiciary by calling a press 
conference. A press conference by the leadership of the judiciary is not 
known in the Egyptian history since the military came to power after the 
1952 revolution. 
Fifth: The resumption of broadcasting al-Qahira al-Youm (“Cairo 
Today”) is the optimal example of progress of freedom of expression and 
mass media following the Revolution. The “Cairo Today” program is one of 
the most popular television shows in Egypt. Its main presenter is Amr 
Adeeb, who is famous for opposing the presidential inheritance project. 
Following an episode sharply criticizing the government media supporting 
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Gamal Mubarak, the channel was shut down. The official reason for the 
shutdown was that the channel administration owed several million pounds 
in debt. Although the channel was truly in debt, the true reason for silencing 
the channel was Adeeb’s criticism of the presidential inheritance project. 
Adeeb resumed broadcasting his show immediately after the ousting of 
Mubarak. As for the state media, the government’s strict censorship policy 
has relaxed. However, this relaxation does not mean that the state media 
now enjoys the same freedom as in other democracies. The state media still 
suffers from limited censorship. The independent media now enjoys more 
autonomy as well if they do not cross the red line of criticizing the military 
under the current regime of Abdel Fatah al-Sisy. 
Sixth: Despite an uneasy transition due to internal and external forces 
operating in the geopolitics of the Middle East, Egypt completed its road 
map toward democracy, by electing a new president in July 1, 2014, drafting 
and popularly legitimating through referendum a new constitution in 
January 2014, and finally electing a new parliament in December 2015. The 
country survived an imminent civil war as what happened in Libya, Syria 
and Yemen. 
Seventh: It is imperative to note that after the Revolution, the new 
government enforced two important judicial decisions ignored by the former 
regimes. The government banned the Ministry of Interior police forces on 
university campuses, and it also showed its intention to implement a 
national minimum wage. Due to the economic crisis facing the nation, the 
enforcement of the latter may be delayed or implemented in two stages. 
What is significant is that the government announced its responsibility to 
enforce judicial decisions. By doing so, the government is acknowledging 
that it is bound by rule of law in post-revolution Egypt, rather than the 
discretion of the ruler and the ruling elite51. 
Despite the aforementioned positive development reported by Ahmed 
Eldakak in 2012, Amr Hamzawy the distinguished scholar of the Middle 
East with a first hand knowledge of Egypt’s politics observed that: 
Recently (September, 2016), Egypt’s parliament has approved—without 
revision—almost all of the 342 presidential-decree laws issued by then-Interim 
President Adly Mansour and by President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi. Despite the clear 
autocratic nature and the violations of basic human rights prevalent in many of 
them, the parliament passed almost all of these laws with very little discussion—a 
testimony to how submissive the legislative branch is to executive power in 
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Egypt and of the growing despotism of Sisi. 
The “Organization of Lists of Terrorist Entities and Terrorists” law is 
particularly troubling. It defines acts of terrorism in an extremely broad manner 
that can be easily manipulated to pursue peaceful dissidents and to punish 
independent nongovernmental organizations. The legislation uses elusive phrases 
such as “preventing and impeding public authorities, disturbing public order, 
harming social peace, endangering the safety and interests of the community, and 
harming national unity and security.” It does not even relate acts of terrorism 
exclusively to the use of violent means or armed force. Rather, it refers to “any 
means”.  
The new law practically enables the government to curtail basic rights and 
freedoms under the banner of counterterrorism efforts. Peaceful assembly, 
expression of dissenting opinions and the formation of opposition political parties 
and independent NGOs are constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms that 
can be undermined once the government classifies practicing them as acts of 
terrorism. 
The law doesn’t necessitate a judicially proven connection with terrorist 
activities for a charge to be filed, and the procedures for inclusion on the list are 
done through what seems to be an opaque procedure between the public 
prosecution and the criminal court. The law doesn’t define the necessary 
documents to submit a request for placement on the list, and leaves all things 
“administrative” to the office of the public prosecutor and the Criminal Court of 
Appeals in Cairo. Affected parties cannot interfere with the question of 
placement on the list before it is executed, and this strips them of their 
constitutional legal right to defend themselves from the charges. 
Furthermore, the law initiates a wide variety of draconian consequences 
without waiting for the outcome of an appeal. They include the banning of listed 
groups, halting of all organizational activities, closing of all locations, 
criminalization of meetings and freezing of assets and funds. Individuals placed 
on the terrorist list may be placed under a travel ban and can expect a cancellation 
of their passports, freezing of their funds and revocation of their constitutional 
right to run for and occupy public office. 
Sisi’s government does not hide its distaste for opposition parties, 
independent NGOs and voices of dissent. It sees them as hostile entities and 
individuals conspiring to impose chaos on Egypt. Demands for the protection of 
human rights and freedoms are, according to Egyptian generals, Trojan horses 
pushed forward to make the country ungovernable. Since Sisi’s ascendancy to 
power following the 2013 military coup, his government has outlawed hundreds 
of NGOs, banned activists from travel and confiscated their assets, and ordered 
investigations and court proceedings against leading human rights 
organizations—most notably the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and 
the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. 
Regrettably, according to Amr Hamzawy 2016, Western silence on Egypt’s 
despotism continues. Western officials and politicians met with Sissi during the 
United Nations General Assembly in New York, including U.S. presidential 
nominees Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump <https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/20/trump-met-his-favorite-middle-east-strongman-
what-happened-next-will-not-surprise-you/>. Sissi unambiguously thinks that his 
repression of civil society is tolerated—if not outright accepted—by the United 
States and Europe. They have yet to prove him wrong.52 
CONCLUSION 
Since the dawn of history, Egypt’s geography and its dependence on 
the water resources of Nile River have led to the institutionalization of a 
centralized government. Rulers’- Pharaohs’, Kings’ and Presidents’- 
personal discretion and the ruling elite interests are the canvas for ruling 
rather than the rule of law. The absence of rule of law was a central reason 
for the first and second Egyptian revolutionary waves of January 25, 2011, 
and June 30, 2013. These two revolutionary waves provide a golden 
opportunity to establish full rule of law in Egypt. This Article analyzes the 
features of absence of rule of law before the Revolution, and after the 1952 
revolution where five Presidents with a military background disregarded the 
rule of law by amending the constitution to promote the rule of the president, 
issuing laws that served the interests of the president’s entourage the 
military, not enforcing judicial decisions, restricting freedom of speech, and 
concentrating the power in the hands of the president through the notorious 
emergency law. The period following the two revolutionary waves 
witnessed an increasing tendency toward respecting the rule of law, through 
changes such as enforcement of judicial decisions, trying the former two 
presidents Mubarak and Mursi, and their associates before courts of law, 
increased promotion of freedom of expression, and judges are giving the 
opportunity to work on drafting laws that would likely have support of all 
political forces. They worked to legislate a more powerful Supreme Judicial 
Council, making it unrestricted of executive oversight and reassigning to the 
council functions that currently belong to the Ministry of Justice. However, 
several serious obstacles to promoting rule of law remain after the two 
revolutionary waves such as the absence of transitional justice, the 
continuation of the state of emergency, and the military trials for civilians. 
Despite an uneasy transition due to internal and external forces operating in 
the geopolitics of the Middle East, Egypt completed its road map toward 
democracy, by electing a new president in July 1, 2014, drafting and 
popularly legitimating through referendum a new constitution in Jan. 2014, 
and finally electing a new parliament in Dec. 2015. The country survived an 
imminent civil war as what happened in Libya, Syria and Yemen. 
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INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICS ON FREEDOM OF THE 
MEDIA 
Aneta Stojanovska-Stefanova & Drasko Atanasoski & Zoran 
Chachorovski 
In this article the authors provide theoretical overview of terms media, 
politics, international politics, of the state as a subject of international law, 
the freedom of information, as well as the impact of the politics over the 
state. The state is the supreme organization of humanity today. In every 
country, the creation of a public opinion occupies a significant place. 
Function-bearers, depending on the degree of democracy, also depending 
on the political system and constitutional order, in their own way tend to 
ensure the favour of the public opinion in order to rule over a longer period 
and in a safer manner. The public opinion is a complex social and political 
phenomenon. Rights and freedoms on the one hand are basic criteria and a 
measure of the position and the role of the people and citizens in the society, 
and democratic regime (the system) on the other. They are an instrument to 
limit the power and disable its arbitrariness and abuse. Knowing that the 
public opinion creates courts for modus operandi of the community and 
appreciation for the actions of the government, it is expected that the 
political rulers seek to impose their influence on the creation of public 
opinion in order to retain or maintain the power. Public opinion as a form 
of political consciousness is associated with the political system as an 
institutional base of the political process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The freedom of expression and the freedom of the media represent the 
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cornerstone of every democratic society. The role of the media is to inform. 
Everyone has the right to receive and communicate information without 
interference by the authorities. This right is guaranteed by all relevant 
international documents ratified by Republic of Macedonia, such as the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1994 and 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms from 1997. 
Another important role of the media is the control which is 
accomplished by requesting a report by the authorities on the manner of 
governance. The essential function of the media is the obligation to 
encourage adebate in the society about important issues of public interest. 
Moreover, they play a representative role, by giving a voice to those who 
are powerless in the society. 
The Constitution of Republic of Macedonia guarantees the civil rights 
and liberties and the rule of law. Also Article 16 guarantees the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of the media. “The freedom of belief, 
conscience, thought and public expression of thoughtis guaranteed. The 
freedom of speech, public address, public informing and the establishment 
of institutions for public informing is guaranteed. The free access of 
information and the freedom to receive and communicate information are 
guaranteed.”1 The same article from the Constitution guarantees the right to 
reply and correction as well as protection of sources of information. 
According to the last provision of this article the censorship is expressly 
prohibited. This liberal concept in the constitution that guarantees freedom 
of the media is operationalized in the media’s legislation. Article No. 3 of 
the Law on Media2, along with other matters, guarantees the freedom of 
information transferfor informing of the public as well as the pluralism and 
diversity of media. In Republic of Macedonia, similar guarantees for 
freedom of the mediaare provided with the Law of Audio and Audio-visual 
Media Services, which was adopted in 20133 which wasadjusted with the 
EU Directives. It also incorporates the standards of EU member-states. 
Article 3 of the law insists that the public broadcasting service, the 
Macedonian Radio Television and the regulating body of media are to be 
transparent, independent, and efficient and accountable. High professional 
                                                 
1 CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, http://www.sobranie.mk/ustav-na-rm.nspx (last visited 
July 2, 2016). 
2 LAW ON MEDIA, http://bit.ly/1KCyZK1 (last visited July 2, 2016). 
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2016). 
2017    INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICS ON FREEDOM    313 
 
standards and principles for journalists in the public service are established. 
Article 111 4  of the aforementioned Law processes the standards of the 
Council of Europe in details, referring that journalists and editors of public 
service in the production of programs should be guided by the principle of 
truthfulness, impartiality and comprehensiveness of information. The same 
article incorporates the principle of political independence and autonomy of 
journalists, making a clear distinction between information and attitude, 
political balance and pluralism of views5. In this sense, the International 
Federation of Journalists and the Code of Journalists of Macedonia (Articles 
14, 15, 16) are warning that the journalists should avoid external interests 
and connections that might harm their reputation for impartiality, fairness 
and integrity. Prominent journalists such as leading columnists in 
newspapers and popular presenters of TV programs, should particularly take 
into account their impartiality and balanced reporting, to provide 
professional distance from the political subject, to nurture the culture of 
speech, to preserve the dignity of their profession, to avoid using their 
medium for confronting people, including their own colleagues and refuse 
the task if it is contrary to the principles of the journalistic profession and 
the Code. 
I. ABOUT THE MEDIA, PUBLIC AND PUBLIC OPINION 
In every country, creating public opinion takes significant place. The 
function-bearers depending on the degree of democracy, the political system 
and constitutional order, all on their own manner tend towards providing 
affection on the public opinion in order to rule for a longer period and in a 
safer manner.  
Media’s freedom is a liberal value that comes from the philosophy of 
freedom and equality of citizens that is enshrined since liberalism. Back 
then it was discussed about the freedom of the press, because other media 
appeared later. It is an expression of the democratic aspirations of the 
citizens for greater political rights and establishing political control over 
political power. There is no absolute freedom of the media, as there is no 
absolute free human activity. Freedom of the press (media) does not mean 
absolute freedom of the media to provide and publish any type of 
information. Even the most democratic societies do not allow the media to 
                                                 
4 Ibid, at 31. 
5 Source: ASSOCIATION OF JOURNALISTS OF MACEDONIA (AJM), http://www.znm.org.mk/drupal-
7.7/sites/default/files/Analiza%20mediumski%20sektor%20MK%20septemvri%202015_0.pdf (last 
visited July 10, 2016). 
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publish sensitive information that endanger state security or child 
pornography. The philosophy of freedom of the media is to determine the 
boundaries of that freedom or to establish a balance between media freedom 
and freedom of expression. In real life there are situations when it is in the 
public interest to limit the principle of maximum speaking the truth due to 
higher social interests6.  
The public opinion is a complex social and political phenomenon. 
According to Habermas, the public opinion as a concept was firstly created 
by the physiocrat Louis-Sebastien Mercier with meaning of enlightened 
result of a common and public reflection on the foundations of social 
organization7.  
According to other authors the term public opinion is of Anglo-Saxon 
origin and was firstly used in England when the public opinion as a support 
to the Parliament was mentioned by the famous English statesman and 
author John Salisbury in 1159. Later Shakespeare mentions the Henry’s IV 
statement: “Opinion, which did help me to the crown”8. Machiavelli also 
emphasizes that the constant concern of the ruler should be winning the 
favour of public opinion, if it wants to preserve power and personal 
security9. 
When defining the term public opinion, the conceptual determination 
of the terms mass, publicity, public and political public are to be put on 
mind.  
The public is a social and political space, in which public opinionarises 
and acts. It is a benefit and requirement of political democracy. Public exists 
where the audience is.  
The audience consists of large number of people with common 
interests or share a common position on an issue. Thus, readers of a 
newspaper, students, members of a club, etc. can serve as an example for the 
public. What keeps the public linked is intellect, and what connects the mass 
of people is emotion. The mass of people gathers in one place, and the 
crowd is dispersed10. 
The mass of people is a latent social force, and the audience is more 
capable factor for social events. The audience can survive like structure only 
if there are so-called own creative centres such as the editorial staff of the 
mass media, theatres, sports clubs and so on. The connection between the 
                                                 
6 MAJHOSHEV A., FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA, YEARBOOK OF THE FACULTY OF LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY 
“GOCE DELCHEV”—STIP (5): 1—7 (2015). 
7 Habermas Jirgen, Javno Mnenje, Belgrade, 124 (1969). 
8 Djordjevic Jovan, Public Opinion, Belgrade, 9 (1957). 
9 More in: Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Gjurgja Skopje (2009). 
10 PERRY A. JOHN & PERRY K. ERNA, THE SOCIAL WEB 279 (New York 1958). 
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audience and the individual is of psychological origin and is constituted by 
the activity of one of these centres, and by their actions they establish the 
connection between people close to affinity, taste or interest, due to which 
the types of audience differentiate11. 
II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AS CONSTITUTIONAL ORIENTATION 
Rights and freedoms are basic criteria and a measure of the position 
and role of people and citizens in society on one hand, and democracy of the 
regime (the system) on the other. They are an instrument to limit the power 
and disable its arbitrariness and abuse. Why discussing fundamental 
freedoms? Because they crawl out of the very nature of man, not the will of 
the state government. “People are born free and equal”, was said by 
Rousseau, and repeated by the Declaration of Independence of the United 
States in 1776.  
The rights are acts of a certain degree of development of civilization, 
the fruit of the new age understanding of the world and life. The theoretical 
dimension of rights and freedoms is closely linked with the theory of natural 
law with the rise of the constitution as a written document and the 
construction of a single international order12.  
According to Siljanovska-Davkova (2001: 24), “the theory of natural 
law connects the freedoms and rights of justice as a value, while the theory 
of positive law of the rights and freedoms is seen as a product of the 
sovereign state power.” 
The theory of natural law in 17th and 18th Centuries will be 
represented by John Locke 13  and Thomas Jefferson. According to both 
everyone is, by nature free and equal and possess inalienable rights and 
inviolable rights that state government can only protect but not limit or 
repeal. Whilst the representatives of the theory of Positive Law believe that 
freedoms and rights are direct creation of the state authority. Therefore 
freedoms and rights are not natural human capacity, but category of the state 
order.  
The idea of human rights and freedoms was established in ancient 
Greece, ancient Rome and medieval period known after numerous charters 
for privileges of certain classes and groups.  
 
                                                 
11 Djordjevic Thomas, Political Public Opinion, Novi Sad, 88 (1975). 
12 SILJANOVSKA DAVKOVA G., T. TRENDAFILOVA & TRENESKA R., HANDBOOK FOR PASSING 
INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION, 24 (Foundation Open Society Institute 2001). 
13 More in: John Locke (1632-1704), English Philosopher , “Two Treatises of Government”. 
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Great Charter of Freedoms (Magna Carta Libertatum) of 1215 in 
certain determinations is still a valid document of common law jurisdictions 
with which the English feudal lords adopted certain privileges for 
themselves and King John Lackland. Article 40 reads as follows: “The right 
and justice shall not be sold, abridged or delayed to anyone.” In the 12th 
Century in England Petition of Rights of 1628 and the Bill of Rights of 1689 
are adopted and especially the famous Habeas Corpus Act (1679) as the 
basis and inspiration for all future documents of such nature. It highlighted 
that no one without authorization can get arrested, be jailed without a proper 
court order, and the right to life, liberty and property rights became positive 
rights. Here are two particularly important declarations. Declaration of 
Independence of the United States from 1776, by which 13 British colonies 
bid farewell to the British king invoking to the political rights of the people 
elaborating the reasons for rejecting the colonial yoke. 
The Bill of Rights of 1776 is the first systematic document on Human 
Rights, proclaimed in 1776 in the state of Virginia. It declared “the rights 
and freedoms of the individual” as an introduction to the Constitution of 
Virginia. However, the Declaration of the Rights of Men and of the Citizens 
from August 28, 1789 is ideological and political platform and program of 
all major revolutionary movements. Article 1 of the Declaration reads as 
follows: “People are born and live free and equal in their rights.” Freedom is 
the ability to do anything that does not harm the other14.  
After World War II, when the attempts at discrimination and 
destruction of man were exposed, the United Nations (UN) was created in 
1945 in San Francisco and the General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In Republic of Macedonia, fundamental 
freedoms and rights of man and citizen are constitutional. Pursuant Article 8 
indent 1 of the Constitution, freedoms and rights are fundamental to the 
constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia. 
In the corps of political rights and freedoms, the Constitution of R. 
Macedonia lists freedom of public speech, freedom of information, freedom 
of political association, the right to vote, the right to peaceful gathering.  
Freedom of public speech and public performance refers to right of 
people to express their thoughts, not only with words but also with other 
means of expression.  
Freedom of informing includes free access to information, freedom to 
receive and communicate information. The Constitution guarantees freedom 
of establishment of institutions for public information, the right to reply in 
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the means of public informing, the right to protect a source of information in 
means for public informing and prohibit censorship15. 
However, freedom of expression in democratic societies cannot be 
absolute. For example what happens when two individuals in the name of 
the right to freedom of expression inadequate and unverifiable tell lies about 
each other, express offensive words? Or, sticking posters on each other 
during the election campaign of the political parties? By limiting the 
freedom of expression it is necessary to enable to exercise other rights and 
freedoms: freedom of movement, right to privacy, the right to association, 
etc16. 
III. THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICS ON THE MEDIA ACCORDING TO THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
For centuries, politicians devoted much of their time trying to “hear” a 
thing called VoxPopuli. Well-known is the story about Harun al-Rashid, the 
caliphate from “Thousand and One Nights” dressed as a beggar walked 
through their caliphate Baghdad hearing to listen to the conversations on the 
streets, to learn about the real opinion of the people he ruled and perceive 
the conditions from a certain angle, which gave the opportunity their more 
authentic presentation. This is a romantic version of what nowadays is a real 
practice in every country. Today, even more, politicians are trying to follow 
the dictates of public opinion, but at the same time, they try to shape and 
manipulate with it. No government can afford the “luxury” to ignore public 
opinion, which at the same time is a subject of interest as well as a product 
of practice. 
Politics is somehow a skill of winning over the social community or 
neutralizing its resistance. The relationship between public opinion and 
authority figures is a two-way: public opinion is shaping politics and 
politicians are shaping public opinion17. 
Knowing that public opinion creates judgments about manner of action 
of the community and assessmentof the actions of the government, it is 
expected that political rulers should try to impose their influence on the 
public opinion in order to retain or maintain power.  
Public opinion as a form of political consciousness is associated with 
the political system as an institutional base of the political process.  
                                                 
15 Ibid, at 29. 
16 Majhoshev A., Professional Standards of the Journalistic Profession, Yearbook 2013/2014, 4 
FACULTY OF LAW 208 (2014). 
17 Klimovski S., Constitutional and Political System, PROSVETNO DELO AD 995—996 (2001). 
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The democratic political system as a totality of forms of organization 
through which the political life is happening, consciously directed activity 
becomes the most important condition for the formation of a free public 
opinion. Democracy exists when there are channels to achieve constantly 
freely and legally recognized influence of social forces of public 
authority.Democratic decision-making would not be possible without free 
formed and informed public opinion, which has the ability to freely impose 
their critical attitude for work on any of those in power18.  
Hence features of public opinion in democracy are: independent 
decision-making, critical judgment on how to perform general work and 
evaluation or indication of the pros and cons of conducting of authority or 
this critical view of society determines the nature of public opinion. Yet this 
determination of public opinion in a democracy is an ideal-approval of type 
design. In reality, public opinion appears with all its virtues and flaws19.  
Public opinion has had its reflection in liberal democratic systems, 
while the totalitarian systems are characterised by “an organized lying”, 
which most clearly portrayed Hannah Arendt. 
Totalitarianism rejects discussion as “landmark of flabby liberalism” 
(Schmidt) and his parliamentarismopposes the dictatorial decision which is 
absolute20. 
The totalitarian system centrally manages the public opinion. The 
dictator and his party through party decrees determine in advance what and 
how to think. An authority which relies on cheers and acclamation stands 
behind this opinion that contains uncultivated and principled superior 
knowledge. Noisy propaganda and the so-called “plebiscitary confirmation” 
of the decisions of the leader serve as a substitute for the public and 
legitimize the usurping government 21 . Totalitarian systems despite the 
propaganda and manipulation do not exclude torture and violence as a way 
to come to reason the plebiscite.  
Unlike them, in democratically organized societiesone basic 
assumption is the presence of active, free, creative public opinion. Public 
opinion becomes an indispensable tool to immediate democratic control of 
power by the public. However, public opinion from one side conducts the 
daily activity of the holders of public authority, but on the other hand does 
not give blank authority to rule i.e. manage as they wish. 
                                                 
18 Ibid, at 996. 
19 Vladimir Milic, The Social Character of Political Public Opinion in BIRTH PUBLIC OPINION AND 
POLITICAL PARTIES 100 (Belgrade 1992). 
20 LJUBOMIR TADIC, PUBLIC OPINION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL CULTURE 463 (Belgrade 1993). 
21 Ibid. 
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Different “models” of public opinion are shaping the preferences of 
those in power. Two basic elements of these models are: the percentage of 
the population that have opinions and the direction and intensity of the 
opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings in this paper suggest that the creation of the public 
opinion takes a significant place in every country. The rulers depending on 
the degree of democracy, political system and constitutional order, historical 
circumstances, all tend towards securing the favour of public opinion in 
order to rule longer and safer. Public opinion is a complex social and 
political phenomenon. Rights and freedoms are basic criteria and a measure 
of the position and role of man and citizen in society on the one hand, and 
democratic regime (the system) on the other. They are an instrument to limit 
the power and disable its arbitrariness and abuse. Knowing that public 
opinion creates judgments about mode of action of community and 
appreciation for the actions of the government, political rulers are expected 
to try to impose their influence on the public opinion in order to retain or 
maintain power. Public opinion as a form of political consciousness is 
associated with the political system as an institutional base of the political 
process. Machiavelli also emphasizes that the constant concern of the ruler 
should be winning the favour of public opinion, if preservation of power and 
personal security is desired. 
When defining the public opinion conceptual determination of the 
terms mass, publicity, public and political public should be taken into 
consideration. Rights are acts of a certain degree since the development of 
civilization, the fruit of New Age understanding of the world and life. The 
theoretical dimension of rights and freedoms is closely linked with the 
theory of natural law, the emergence of the constitution as written document. 
In the core of the political rights and freedoms, the Constitution lists 
freedom of public speech, freedom of information, freedom of political 
association, the right to vote, the right to peaceful gathering. 
Freedom of public speech and public performance refers to the right of 
people to express their thoughts, not only in words but also with other 
means of expression. Freedom of informing includes free access to 
information, freedom to receive and communicate information. The 
Constitution guarantees freedom of establishment of institutions for public 
information, the right to reply in the public informing means, the right to 
protect a source of information in the media and prohibit censorship.  
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Knowing that public opinion creates judgments about manner of action 
of community and appreciation for the actions of the government, political 
rulers are expected to try to impose their influence on the public opinion in 
order to retain or maintain power. Four known theories of mass media with 
its features have provided a clearer picture of historical development, as 
well as the impact that the state government or the business community can 
have on media freedom. Public opinion as a form of political consciousness 
is associated with the political system as an institutional base of the political 
process. The democratic political system as a totality of forms of 
organization through which the political life is happening, and as 
consciously directed activity becomes the most important condition for the 
formation of a free public opinion. Unlike them, the totalitarian systems 
centrally manage public opinion. The dictator and his party through party 
decrees determine in advance what and how to think. An authority which 
relies on cheers and acclamation stands behind this opinion that contains 
uncultivated and principled superior knowledge. Noisy propaganda and so-
called “Plebiscitary confirmation” of the decisions of the leader serves as a 
substitute for the public and legitimizes the usurping power. Hence the 
conclusion is that the type of political system and the level of democracy of 
authority undoubtedly influence the development of media’s freedom. In 
terms of democratic development the media should provide openness to 
different opinions and political views, unbiased reporting on political parties 
and political actors, and to refrain from hate speech and discrimination on 
any grounds, particularly on the basis of political affiliation. Impartiality, 
apropos indicates that the media, especially electronic media, in news 
reports may not express views for or against a political party, nor to act as 
representatives of particular political views in the current political debate. 
 

